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Mexico versus Canada:  Stability Benefits 









Using a de facto classification of exchange-rate regimes, this paper investigates how the volatility 
of PPP-GDP per person and per hour of work is associated with such regimes in Mexico and in 
Canada. It finds that, for Mexico unlike Canada, the macroeconomic volatility left is much greater 
during periods when the nominal exchange rate with USD changes appreciably than when it is 
quasi-pegged. However, Mexico cannot safely peg to USD except through formal US-
dollarization. Hence this finding suggests that the stability benefits of monetary union are greatest 
for emerging-market countries inside an economically integrating region and non-existent for 
financially highly advanced countries.  
 
1. Introduction 
Even though (1) monetary policy goals and instruments (2) exchange-rate concerns, and 
(3) trade orientation toward the United States are strikingly similar for Canada and Mexico, this 
                                                          
*
  The author is indebted to the editor of the special issue of this journal for useful suggestions and comments. Earlier 
versions were presented on January 7, 2005 at an AEA/SPM session of the Allied Social Science Associations 
meetings in Philadelphia, on April 21, 2005 at the Tenth Annual Conference of the Center for the Study of Western 
Hemispheric Trade, Texas A&M International University, Laredo, and on June 27, 2005 at the Global Finance 
Conference, Trinity College Dublin. 
±
  George M. von Furstenberg is currently the J.H. Rudy Professor of Economics at Indiana University.  He also was 
the inaugural holder of the Robert Bendheim Chair in Economic and Financial Policy at Fordham University 2000-
2003. Work at the IMF (Division Chief, 1978-83) and at USG agencies, such as HUD (1967-68), the President's 
Council of Economic Advisers (Senior Economist, 1973-76) and the Department of State (1989-90), alternated with 
his academic pursuits. In Washington, he has also been a resident fellow, economist, or adviser at both the Brookings 
Institution and AEI. His interests are consequently policy-oriented, broad and international, with core subjects of 
macroeconomic theory and international finance.  His long-standing research interests in monetary and exchange 
arrangements that are most stabilizing and growth-supporting, especially for developing countries, are reflected not 
only in numerous articles in professional journals but also in his most recent  book projects. These were Regulation 
and Supervision of Financial Institutions in the NAFTA Countries (ed., Kluwer, 1997), Learning from the World’s 
Best Central Bankers (co-author, Kluwer, 1998), and Monetary Unions and Hard Pegs: Effects on Trade, Financial 
Development, and Stability (co-ed., Oxford U. Press, 2004).  He has also been an active, and since published, 
participant and presenter at the Tokyo (2003) and Hong Kong (2004) Meetings of the Asian Economic Policy Panel. 
During the first half of 2004 he was a visiting research economist at the Deutsche Bundesbank (German Central 
Bank) in Frankfurt analyzing issues of financial development, particularly in the countries then acceding to the 
European Union. 
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paper questions whether the same exchange rate arrangement is appropriate for both. Regarding 
these similarities: 
 
1. Both Canada and Mexico explicitly target a low inflation rate, 2 percent an average for 
Canada and 3 percent within a 1 percentage point band on either side for Mexico (for 
2005). Neither country uses reserve requirements, and Mexico even announces daily the 
combined short position (corto) intended for the banking and credit institutions 
participating in its clearance system. Planned changes in this position are used to convey 
monetary policy impulses.  
2. Canada similarly adjusts the Overnight Rate through open-market operations either to 
effect a change in monetary conditions or to counteract multilateral exchange-rate 
movements in which the U.S. dollar (USD) has an 86 percent weight. If no change in 
monetary conditions is intended, a 3 percent depreciation of the Canadian dollar calls for a 
1 percentage point increase in the interest rate (commercial paper rate) according to the 
Bank of Canada’s Monetary Conditions Index to keep aggregate demand unchanged as 
well as incidentally to stabilize its, formally floating, exchange rate. In Mexico, exposure 
to U.S. interest rate movements and abrupt changes in international capital flows, and 
hence to disorderly movements of its exchange rate, are a continuous concern in part 
because inflation targeting within a narrow band cannot succeed there unless exchange 
rate fluctuations with USD are of low amplitude.  
3. Both countries conduct about 80 percent of their trade and much of their foreign finance 
with or through the United States. Hence the bilateral exchange rates of their currencies 
with USD and developments affecting the U.S. business outlook and interest rates are of 
paramount concern to both of them. 
 
In view of these similarities, it is tempting to conclude that the same exchange rate regime 
of independent floating with USD as with all other currencies should be equally attractive to 
Canada and Mexico. This paper documents instead a major asymmetry between Canada and 
Mexico with regard to their monetary and financial credibility and usable policy independence. It 
finds that factors that move exchange rates so much as to make them appear non-pegged leave 
heightened macroeconomic volatility in Mexico but not in Canada. For Mexico, liability 
dollarization, resulting in part from inability to borrow long-term in the domestic currency or to 
be able to do so only at punishing real interest rates or with high collateral, means that large 
depreciations pose a threat of bankruptcy for banks and their counterparties and hence to the 
entire financial intermediation system. Hence some form of monetary union with the United 
States, even the formal unilateral dollarization of Mexico, could provide major insurance and 
stability benefits for Mexico. 
 For a broader perspective, leaving aside the issuers of major international currencies, the 
United States and the euro area, there are two other groups of countries that have opened up fully 
to international financial markets: 
 
(1) One group consists of countries like Canada, Japan, Singapore, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom that have advanced financial systems 
and are net exporters of financial services even though the network 
externalities afforded by their own currency to other countries are limited and 
not truly global. 
(2) The second group of interest contains high-income emerging-market 
countries that appear unable for the foreseeable future to establish a currency 
that can credibly promise to maintain its purchasing power over 
internationally traded goods in the long run. These currency denominations 
are acceptable for only a limited range of financial transactions even in their 
 17
own country, and their domain is threatened by actual or potential currency 
substitution. Elevation from group (2) to (1) involves a lengthy testing and 
qualification process which most emerging-market countries have failed 
repeatedly.  
 
To bring welfare-relevant evidence to bear on the proposition that keeping their own 
national money may be useful for the first group of countries but not the second, I make use of 
NAFTA’s containing one country from each group, Canada and Mexico, inside an economically 
integrating region. This allows for interesting contrasts. 
 
1.1. NAFTA Missing an Opportunity from the Start 
 When Mexico entered NAFTA, it could not plan on credibly fixed exchange rates that end 
in a common currency with the United States.1 Despite significant dollarization of business 
liabilities and the holding of U.S. currency and other dollar-denominated financial assets by 
Mexican households, formal U.S.-dollarization or co-managed forms of monetary union were not 
considered. That meant that future cost and competitiveness relations between Mexico and the 
United States would remain highly variable and uncertain, hampering business-location decisions 
and long-term planning. Mexico’s economic performance has fallen well short of model-based 
long-term forecasts made just before NAFTA went into effect that stressed the growth benefits of 
accelerated transfer of embodied technology and growing capital intensity.2 Insufficient 
allowance for the heightened exposure to capital-account shocks and financial instability implied 
by Mexico’s maintaining a separate currency after opening its capital markets may be among the 
reasons for these forecast errors. Perhaps the still quite strong current best estimate, that, ceteris 
paribus, currency union is associated with a doubling of trade between its members (see the meta-
analysis by Rose, 2004), is due in part to the avoidance of currency crises and of exchange-rate 
instability which membership in such a union may bring. 
  
2. Key Insurance Functions of Common Currency 
This section seeks to explain why and how monetary union may reduce the variability of 
living standards in financially backward, but not in advanced countries because this is the 
maintained hypothesis or conjecture subsequently to be tested. Elaborating on Baur et al. (2001, 
3-12), the principal insurance benefits of a common currency, particularly for emerging-market 
countries switching to a world-class money, are: 
 
• Lower information and transaction costs. The broadening of the financial 
market in the common currency encourages standardization of instruments, financial 
reports and prospectuses, and of market rules and practices. Monetary union thereby 
lowers both information and transaction costs and facilitates more accurate risk 
assessment. A reduction in the costs of investing and transacting across borders, in 
                                                          
1
  Unilateral U.S.-dollarization raises several politically uncomfortable issues of foreign control. Formal dollarization 
makes takeover of a country’s financial system by U.S.-based institutions with a technological and funding 
advantage all but certain. Greater exposure to U.S. regulations, information-harvesting and sharing mandates then 
follow. The least concern should be with U.S. monetary policy’s not suiting other dollarized countries in the region. 
The reason is that strong growth under dollarization of functional interdependencies in trade and finance would make 
a policy that is bad for Latin America less likely to be good for the United States.  
2
  von Furstenberg and Teolis (1993, 137) estimated that Mexico’s economic size would rise from 4.4 percent of U.S. 
GDP in 1990 to 11.0 percent without and 12.2 percent with monetary union by the year 2025. Taking an average of 
the 2002 and 2003 ratios, each calculated using that year’s average peso exchange rate with USD, the ratio of 
Mexico’s GDP to that of the United States had risen to only 5.9 percent. Thus the 7.0 percent ratio that had been 
forecast in the above source for 2005 with NAFTA but without prospect of monetary union now seems out of reach 
as conditional convergence has been unexpectedly slow. Kose, Meredith and Towe (2004) sort through the forecasts 
of NAFTA’s effects on Mexico’s growth contained in other pre-1994 studies.   
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turn, will reduce home bias in investment (see Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000, 363-365) 
and lead to greater diversification. Canada has already standardized much of its 
accounting and finance on U.S. or international best-practice models; Mexico has 
not done so. 
• Increased insurability and avoidance of unproductive risks.  Monetary union 
lowers some risks and makes others more insurable in emerging-market countries. 
Eliminating currency crises for such countries by having them substitute a widely 
used international currency in the region for their own removes a major, not hitherto 
insurable, macroeconomic risk. It does so by eliminating currency mismatches due 
to liability dollarization, a condition that can spread massive economic damage 
through the financial system in the event of a currency crisis. The welfare gains from 
greatly reducing the likelihood of falling into this catastrophic region are bound to be 
large.  
• Risk reduction, external finance and privatization. Any financial 
development encouraged by monetary union increases the number of sources and 
instruments for funding business capital formation. This contribution is especially 
important in emerging-market countries where dependence on hard-to-get financing 
from outside the domestic firm is one of the major constraints on its investment (see 
Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Reducing investment risk and uncertainty about future 
real exchange rates and future competitiveness among members and having safe 
access to borrowing in an international currency without precipitating currency 
mismatches can bring down the discount rate applied to future earnings. Calvo and 
Mishkin (2003, 101) have pointed to fiscal, financial, and monetary stability as key 
to macroeconomic success in emerging-market countries, and monetary union tends 
to promote all three.  
• Risk transfer through capital market development. The function of insurance 
and of contingent claims is to transfer risks from principals for whom bearing these 
risks is costly to parties for whom it is less costly through diversification across 
different, i.e., imperfectly correlated, types of risk and through pooling of 
individuals' exposure to given types of risk. By stimulating financial development, 
particularly of the insurance sector, and of a deep and internally and externally 
diversified market for financial instruments including derivatives, monetary union 
facilitates such risk transfer, particularly for Mexico. As Hausmann et al. (2000,155) 
explain and the Mexican crisis of 1994/95 and Argentine crisis of 2001/02 showed 
once again, emerging-market countries have no capable internal lender of last resort 
in a major crisis and could be better off enhancing insurability by joining in 
monetary union.  
 
In sum, in contrast to financially advanced countries, emerging-market countries can look 
forward to the reduction in macroeconomic volatility and in the cost of capital through better 
information, reduction of currency and uninsurable catastrophic risk, and greater insurance of 
those risks that remain as outstanding contributions of monetary union. Such a spur to financial 
development will in turn increase economic growth (see Bandiera et al., 2000; Fisman and Love, 
2004; Guiso et al., 2004). Having defined some of the insurance benefits expected from monetary 
union for emerging-market countries, the next question is, of course, whether any evidence can be 
brought to bear on these matters based on the changing exchange-rate regimes between NAFTA 
countries. 
 
3.  Exchange-Rate Regimes and the Volatility of PPP-GDP per Hour and per Person 
For lack of a North American monetary union, the stabilization effects of such a union for 
Mexico more than Canada can be inferred only partially from episodes of fixed versus floating 
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exchange rates of their respective currency with USD. Such episodes mimic the one aspects of 
monetary union that relates to the maintenance of fixed exchange rates (at the rate of 1:1 for the 
same money). Because monetary union delivers much deeper financial integration than that 
available from pegged exchange rates between separate currencies alone, any stabilization effects 
associated with episodes of quasi-fixed exchange rates will be a lower-bound estimate of those 
expected from monetary union for emerging-market countries. 
If a peripheral economy’s trade and finance both are highly dependent on that of a 
dominant country -- or, in Europe, group of countries -- with an international currency, it may 
gain little benefit from letting its own currency float. In fact, the volatility of its real PPP-GDP3 
per hour and per person may be an increasing function of the extent to which the exchange rate of 
its currency with that of the dominant partner changes. This claim and the evidence, pro and con, 
are detailed first. I then analyze the effects on the volatility of living standards of the different de-
facto exchange-rate arrangements of Canada and Mexico, countries that have a history of 
switching repeatedly between exchange-rate regimes.  
According to interpretations of the evidence for Latin America associated with Fernández-
Arias and Hausmann (2000) and Calvo and Reinhart (2002), in such countries floating provides 
little usable monetary independence, does not effectively discourage dollarization and currency 
mismatches, and reduces the depth of domestic financial intermediation relative to what it would 
be under credibly fixed rates, particularly in the nontraded-goods sector.4  Specifically, Hausmann 
et al. (2000, 141-145) find that Latin American central banks use exchange-rate flexibility very 
sparingly and interest-rate defenses very heavily to keep exchange rates from falling very far and 
fast, particularly if they are formally floating. In addition, fixed-exchange-rate regimes lead on 
average to lower real interest rates so that peso problems associated with fixed rates raise interest 
rates less than the risk premiums that are attributable to even greater uncertainty about future 
levels of exchange rates under floating.  
Furthermore, Hausmann et al. continue, letting the exchange rate fluctuate with the terms 
of trade strengthens the positive covariance that agents experience between shocks to their income 
and accumulated wealth. The result is a “double whammy” to their living standards when the 
terms of trade decline and the exchange value of the currency plunges unless they hold their 
wealth in credible assets denominated in hard foreign currency. Falling exchange rates also 
expose currency mismatches of financial institutions and their counterparties to the extent parts of 
their domestic loans and deposits are denominated in the dominant international currency of their 
region. Letting the exchange rate go then leads to an increase in interest rates, has a large 
inflationary impact, and causes a major decline in output (Hausmann et al., 2000, 138). The latter 
occurs because a large and sudden depreciation is both cause and effect of the disruption of a 
country’s foreign and domestic intermediation and financing systems. Floating thus heightens real 
exchange-rate volatility,5 currency risk, and the risk of financial crisis according to this 
interpretation, thereby justifying a fear of floating -- in Latin America usually sinking -- exchange 
                                                          
3
  PPP refers to conversion at Purchasing Power Parity to international dollars as further explained later in this 
section. International-dollar aggregates reflect relative prices that are more representative globally than those 
prevailing just in the United States.  
4
  The exchange-rate disagreements precipitated by some of the parties’ to a free-trade agreement choosing to float 
are explained and analyzed by Fernández-Arias, Panizza, and Stein (2004). Tornell, Westermann, and Martinez 
(2004) attribute NAFTA and Mexico’s undistinguished economic performance since 1995 to a protracted credit 
crunch that has hit the nontradable-goods sector especially severely for lack of dollar-receivables and access to 
foreign financing. They do not call attention to Mexico’s transition to floating having contributed to the low level of 
financial services being delivered to peso-loan-dependent sectors of the economy, but such an inference may well be 
drawn. 
5
  Teolis and von Furstenberg (1993) found that over largely quasi-pegged periods, such as 1957:02-1976:08 and 
1988:04-1992:06, the monthly variability of the real exchange rate between the Mexican peso and USD was between 
1 and 3 times as great as that within the United States between Chicago and Los Angeles, which are among the 
metropolitan areas for which CPIs are reported. During the largely non-pegged or freely falling period for the peso in 
between, 1976:10-1988:02, it was 41 to 58 times as great.  
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rates. Edwards (2002, 246-248) has attempted to show, however, that not all policy reactions to 
exchange rate movements are sub-optimal, or deserve to be labeled as “fear of floating” even 
though the optimal amount of floatation in small and open economies generally may be small. 
An alternative claim regularly emphasized in publications of the Canadian and Chilean 
central banks6 is that floating, for these countries at least, has been a welfare-enhancing shock 
absorber facilitating and smoothing adjustment to the equilibrium level of real exchange rates and 
both terms-of-trade and capital-account shocks. Since Chile is highly dependent on the United 
States only in finance and Canada only in trade, their conditions are not comparable to those of 
Mexico because Mexico is highly dependent on the United States in both trade and finance. It is 
for countries with this double dependency for which the assertion made at the beginning of this 
section, about floating their currency being of little benefit, is most likely to be apt. In addition, 
Calvo and Mishkin’s (2003, p. 107) judgment, that “for a central bank without inflation-fighting 
credibility, an expansionary monetary policy will only lead to an immediate jump in interest rates 
and/or the price level” applies to Argentina and, at least until recent years, to Mexico, but 
certainly not to Canada as they note. Rather, in Canada an easing (decrease) of its Monetary 
Conditions Index involves a decline in the level of interest rates relative to their U.S. level and a 
consequent depreciation of the CAD/USD exchange rate without an immediate rise in the 
inflation rate.  
Although about half the value of bonds outstanding of Canadian corporations is in USD, 
the share of variable-rate credit market instruments whose interest rates are set as USD-LIBOR+ 
is comparatively small because Canadian firms borrow principally in the U.S., and not the euro-
dollar market (Murray and Powell, 2003, 164). In Mexico, many large businesses are 
predominantly USD-financed, particularly at the long end, with the IMF (2004a, 51-61) providing 
useful data on the development of other aspects of Mexico’s dollarization. The elasticity of 
Canada’s overnight borrowing rate with respect to movements in the U.S. effective federal funds 
rate so far this decade has been only about 0.6. Perhaps because of “fear of sinking” engendered 
by widespread liability dollarization, the elasticity of Mexico’s interbank rate (28-day TIIE) with 
respect to the U.S. federal funds rate has been 1.9, three times as high as the comparable elasticity 
in Canada.7 Hence the consequences of having chosen a particular exchange-rate regime, if 
indeed there was a choice, are likely to be quite different for Canada and Mexico as Hausmann et 
al. (2000, 138) have emphasized. They argued that floating confers very little monetary 
                                                          
6
  From the Bank of Canada see, for instance, Murray (1999), Laidler (1999) and Schembri (2001). From the Banco 
Central de Chile see Morandé and Schmidt-Hebbel (2000) and Edwards and Magendzo (2002).  For Mexico, 
exchange-rate movements that show a tendency to bring the exchange rate back to fundamental equilibrium 
identified by a variety of models have been difficult to document. One careful recent study (Fullerton, Hattori, and 
Calderón , 2001), for instance, concludes that “in no case ... do any of the error correction models generate forecasts 
[of the MXP/USD exchange rate] that produce superior rates of accuracy than those associated with a simple random 
walk.” Buiter (1999, 49) criticizes the “fine tuning fallacy” according to which monetary policy can be used 
systematically and effectively at least in advanced countries to dampen the effect on the real economy of external 
and/or internal shocks. 
7
  To derive these results I took the logarithm of the respective gross interest rates (1+r, where r is the interest rate 
expressed as a fraction) reported by the respective central banks and regressed the Canadian and Mexican rates so 
derived with intercept and AR1 correction on those of the United States, using monthly data from January 2000 
through October 2004. With t-values in parentheses, for Canada, the intercept was 0.015(4.77), the final value of rho 
estimated with the Prais and Winsten algorithm was 0.918(17.52), and the elasticity with respect to the U.S. rate was 
0.643(8.46) with an adjusted R-square of 0.96. For Mexico the intercept was 0.046(7.18), rho was 0.705(7.51), and 
the elasticity with respect to the U.S. rate was 1.904(10.62) with adjusted R-square of 0.93. The nominal interest 
rates in the 4-3/4 years long sample averaged 2.82% with 2.42% inflation for a real interest rate of 0.39% in the 
United States, 3.41% with 2.36% inflation (almost the same average inflation rate as for the United States) for a real 
rate of 1.03% in Canada, and 9.86% in Mexico with 5.33% inflation for a real rate of 4.30%, almost 4 percentage 
points higher than in the United States. 
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independence, on Mexico.8 Indeed it leaves Mexico with disproportionately large interest-rate 
dependence on the United States. 
Mexican-peso interest rates not only move strongly with dollar interest rates in the United 
States but, as documented in a previous note, there is also a 4-percentage-point real excess return 
required on even the shortest top-quality loans of ready funds in Mexico compared with the 
United States while the equivalent excess for Canada (of 0.6 percentage point) is insubstantial by 
comparison. There were no credible indications that the peso was overvalued relative to USD in 
October 2004. Hence it is unlikely that Mexican and foreign investors needed to be compensated 
in advance for any real depreciation leading toward equilibrium that they saw lurking past the 
January 2000-October 2004 data frame. It is also implausible to argue that interbank domestic-
currency obligations were subject to appreciable fulfillment risk in Mexico during this period so 
that a default premium might have crept in. Hence the 4-percentage-point excess over the U.S. 
real federal funds rate must be viewed as a pure risk premium and as the type of surcharge on the 
international cost of capital that emerging-market countries with limited credibility just do not 
seem to be able to escape as long as they keep their own currency and the policy risks that go with 
it. 
 
3.1.  The Welfare Significance of the Volatility of PPP Measures of GDP per Hour and 
Head 
Particularly in countries like Mexico, in which consumer borrowing is still in its infancy, 
the adverse effect on welfare of greater volatility of real GDP per person, even at unchanged 
expected levels of this variable, is an obvious consequence of convex utility. For liquidity-
constrained consumers, rates of change in personal consumption are highly correlated with those 
in real income, so that income variability can be used in lieu of consumption variability, which is 
commonly taken as a welfare criterion (e.g., in Engel, 2001, who presents evidence for Mexico). 
For those remaining employed under somewhat flexible work arrangements, increased volatility 
of real GDP per hour worked lowers expected utility in part also from the supply side: 
Diminishing marginal utility of leisure is encountered as work effort is shifted temporarily in 
response to fluctuating compensation rates.  
The merits of basing welfare inferences about consumption volatility on PPP-dollar 
measures require more justification. If our focus were mainly on comparing living standards in 
two countries, choosing dollar-converted PPP measures clearly would be preferable to using 
measures converted to the same currency with actual (annual) average exchange rates.9 The 
reason is that the latter fail to reflect the true quantity levels of goods and services embodied in 
the aggregates being compared in a given year and also the true movements in relative volumes of 
these goods and services over time to the extent exchange rates do not reflect absolute or even 
relative PPP (Ahmad, no date, p. 2). The exact measurement of the PPP measures to be compared 
could be important also for international welfare comparisons of the volatility rather than levels of 
GDP per hour or per head. For instance, income variability may be more costly in relation to the 
utility of the expected value of the chosen PPP measure of real income, the closer that value for 
parts of the population comes to an assumed absolute subsistence minimum (that could trigger the 
Inada condition). Welfare-relevant logarithmic volatility measures then depend on the precise 
                                                          
8
  Hausmann et al. (2000, 149) estimated that a 1-percentage point hike in the U.S. rate caused a 5.93 percentage 
point increase in the rate for Mexico during the period September 1997 - February 1999 containing the East-Asian 
and then the Russian default crises of 1997 and 1998 and the Brazilian crisis of 1998/99. My estimate reported in the 
previous note for the quieter period that followed is less than one-third as large but still far, and highly significantly, 
above 1 while the Canadian response elasticity is statistically significantly below 1.  
9
  The difference PPP conversion makes tends to be large for developing countries but not for advanced countries 
similar to the United States.  In 1993, for instance, the PPP exchange rates for CAD and MXP relative to USD were 
1.281 and 2.102 respectively (Ahmad, no date, p. 27). The corresponding average annual market rates were 1.290 
and 3.116, implying essentially no difference for Canada but a large percentage deviation in PPP from the market 
exchange rate for Mexico. 
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level of welfare because the utility function from which they are derived displays decreasing, 
rather than constant, relative risk aversion. Even setting such scale-dependence aside, using long 
time series for different countries that are all constructed by the same welfare-consistent statistical 
method applied in the World Bank’s International Comparison Project (ICP) may be preferable to 
using a variety of national measures that are deflated in different ways. 
 
3.2.  Differences in the Expected Volatility of PPP Measures of GDP per Hour and per 
Head 
 Having illustrated the use, and argued for the usefulness, of PPP measures of real GDP, it 
is now time to show how PPP-GDP per Person (GDPP) and per Hour (GDPH), and hence their 
volatilities, are related. For this comparison it is useful to consider the identity: 
 
GDPP = GDPH(H/EMPL)(EMPL/LF)(LF/PWA)(PWA/POP)  (1) 
 
Here H/EMPL is annual hours of work per employee, EMPL/LF is the complement of the 
unemployment rate, LF/PWA is the labor force (LF) participation rate with PWA denoting the 
population of working age, and PWA/POP is the complement of the dependency ratio, where 
POP is total population.  
Now because hours per employee, H/EMPL, the employment rate, EMPL/LF, and the 
labor force participation rate, LF/PWA, are all decidedly pro-cyclical, GDPP must be more 
cyclical than GDPH. Indeed, in exceptional cases such as those associated with the Thatcher 
“revolution” in the UK after 1979, GDPH could even be countercyclical if a recession and 
changes in labor laws induce not labor hoarding but massive labor shedding and plant closings so 
that only the more efficient operations survive. Hence GDPP will reflect demand-side 
disturbances to a greater extent than GDPH. GDPH will be relatively more exposed to supply-side 
disturbances, including shocks resulting from changes in the terms of trade. Empirically, the 
standard deviation of the sample standard deviations estimated in the succession of moving three-
year windows is uniformly greater for the volatility of GDPP than for the volatility of GDPH for 
Canada and the United States but not for Mexico; both standard deviations are highest for 
Mexico. 
There was little difference in the mean volatility of rates of change in Mexico’s GDPP and 
GDPH. A series of bold entries in Table I shows that the correlation between the annual rates of 
change in GDPP and GDPH is 0.90 for Mexico, but only half as large, 0.45, for Canada. Results 
obtained with the volatility of each of the two measures thus are likely to differ more for Canada 
than for Mexico which is our main focus. Even so testing for the consistency of the results 
obtained with the two measures appears worthwhile. The 0.59 (0.78) correlation between 
Canadian and US annual rates of change of GDPH (GDPP) suggests that there is much 
synchronous volatility spillover from the United States to Canada, particularly in the more 
cyclical of the two measures. The much lower correlations between matching Mexican and US 
rates of change of 0.22 (0.17), make a finding of statistically significant volatility spillover from 
the United States to Mexico less likely.  
We are now ready to investigate empirically the way the volatility of either measure 
relates to the exchange-rate regimes that have prevailed in Canada and Mexico from 1950 
(GDPP) or 1960 (GDPH) to 2003, using data available from the Groningen Growth and 
Development Centre (2004) for these concepts and periods.10  Volatility measures are constructed 
                                                          
10
  I am grateful to Gary Martin of the Bureau of Labor Statistics – Foreign Labor Statistics, for directing me to this 
source. It provides data at http://www.ggdc.net/homeggdc.htm on GDP per hour in 1999 USD converted only at EKS 
PPPs and on GDP per person in 1999 USD converted only at GK PPPs. The EKS (Elteto-Koves-Szulc) and GK 
(Geary-Khamis) methods of computing PPPs are described in Ahmad (no date, 7-10). He notes, “The advantage of 
the EKS method is that it is built up from Fisher type index numbers and has properties that are desirable from the 
standpoint of consumer choice theory. The major drawback of EKS [compared with GK] is that it is not additive, i.e., 
the sum of the components of national accounts would not equal the total.”  
 23
as centered rolling standard deviations of three adjoining annual rates of change in the respective 
measures. For instance, if the first “level” datum available is for 1950, the first rate of change is 
constructed for 1951 from 1950, and the first volatility measure, centered at 1952, is simply the 
standard deviation of the rates of change calculated for 1951, 1952, and 1953. All volatility 
measures are constructed for Canada, Mexico, and the United States, where the respective U.S. 
measure may serve as one of the explanatory variables for the volatility of GDPP or GDPH in 
Canada and Mexico.  
 
3.3. Characterizing the de Facto Exchange-Rate Regimes in Canada and Mexico 
The exchange-rate regime is characterized analogously as a rolling window of three-year 
centered averages. The first value used in the above series, for instance, is the average of the 
dummy variable levels used to characterize the exchange-rate regime in 1951, 1952, and 1953 
centered on 1952 just as the last value is the average of the levels for 2001, 2002, and 2003, 
centered on 2002.  This procedure allocates the exchange regime in any year in equal parts to 
what was laid in store in the previous year, what happened in the current year, and what ensued in 
the following year. For instance, if a peg is abandoned in a year of crisis, the coding for the de 
facto exchange-rate behavior during the crisis spills over in both directions, backward and 
forward. Looked at differently, it takes a sequence of three years of the same regime to attribute 
the middle year of that sequence fully, and reasonably securely, to that regime. Of course some 
small unobserved probability of transition applies in any year in progress even when no transition 
occurred in surrounding years.   
Because Reinhart and Rogoff (2003) have succeeded in driving home the point that the 
formally-declared and actual exchange-rate regimes often differ, we simply classify exchange-rate 
regimes in Canada and Mexico by the extent of within-year (yearend-to-yearend) changes in the 
nominal exchange rate: less than 5 percent up or down (dummy value of 0 for “pegged” or “quasi-
pegged”),11 or changes of 5 percent or more (dummy value of 1 for “non-pegged”). The latter 
episodes are subdivided into those where the nominal exchange rate changed by at least 5 percent 
but less than 40 percent per annum (dummy value 1 as before) and years in which it changed (in 
actuality, depreciated) by 40 percent or more (dummy value 2 for “non-pegged freely-falling”). 
This extreme non-pegged class, which is empty in Canada, is similar to Reinhart and Rogoff”s 
“freely falling” category for cases with 12-month inflation over 40 percent per annum. The largest 
annual rate of change in Canada was an 18-percent nominal appreciation in 2003.12 
The coding used for the entire period, 1950-2003, is indicated in Table II. As this table 
shows, the exchange rate of the CAD with the USD acted as if it were effectively pegged every 
year from 1950 through 1976 with the exception of just one year, 1970. Yet as Schembri (2001, 
31) reports, Canada had what it officially classified as a floating rate in 43 out of the past 51 
years, 1950-2000. By contrast, Table II shows de facto pegging in 40 of these same 51 years, and 
non-pegging in only 11. Mexico turned in the same record of pegging to the US dollar as Canada 
in the early part of the time series, from 1950 through 1975, with the exception of again just one 
year, 1954. Hence the longer data period for GDPP, effectively starting with values centered on 
1952, has considerably more observations generated under pegged or quasi-pegged exchange-rate 
arrangements than the shorter period for GDPH starting with values centered on 1962. 
                                                          
11
  Article 4 of the Smithsonian Agreement of December 1971 made provision for 2.25 percentage point 
margins of exchange rate fluctuations above and below a central rate. The exchange rate with the dollar of 
countries availing themselves of these margins (that were wider than the 1 percentage point on either side 
stipulated in Section 3 of Article IV of the original (1944) Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary 
Fund) thus could fluctuate by at most 4.5 percent inside this band. However, Mexico in 1971 chose not to 
change either its central rate (12.5 old peso per dollar) or its margins, and Canada continued to proceed 
without a central rate or par value. 
12
  Given that the level of interest rates was already very low in Canada in 2003, a 6 percentage point reduction 
to keep the Monetary Conditions Index unchanged would not have been feasible, making the potential 
adjustment of interest rates to exchange rate movements in Canada somewhat asymmetric.  
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3.4. Regression Estimates for the Volatility of Rates of Change in GDPP and GDPH 
 Construction of the dependent variables, and the like explanatory variable from the United 
States, starts with taking the respective levels of GDPP or GDPH reported in the source already 
identified for each year t 1950-2003 for the former and 1960-2003 for the latter for Canada and 
Mexico. The operation used to derive rates of change (in percentage points) from these variables, 
generically called y, is 100dln(yt+1) = 100ln(yt+1/yt), so that annual rates are calculated for 1951 to 
2003 from the preceding year for y=GDPP and for 1961 through 2003 for GDPH. The centered 
rolling-window volatility measures then are the standard deviation (STDEV) constructed from 3 
rates of change such that Volatilityt+2 = STDEV[100dln(yt+1), 100dln(yt+2), 100dln(yt+3)]. Hence 
the first volatility measure that can be constructed is for 1952 and the last for 2002 if y=GDPP, 
for a total of 51 observations. The range is from 1962 to 2002 for GDPH, for a total of 41 
observations.  
 The regression results in Table III show highly significant volatility spillover of 50 percent 
from the United States to Canada for (rates of change of) GDPP. The spillover for GDPH is one-
fifth but not statistically significant at the 5 percent level. For Mexico, this spillover is either 
positive (GDPP) or negative (GDPH) and insignificant. This is the type of result for Mexico that 
has often been misused to argue against credibly-fixed exchange rate arrangements, such as 
dollarization or other forms of monetary union, with the United States on the ground of an alleged 
lack of symmetry of shock exposure. In fact, the highly significant coefficient on the exchange-
rate regime index for Mexico shows that volatility is systematically greater when the exchange 
rate is moving around than when it stays quasi-pegged to USD. Specifically, solved at the mean 
level of volatility for the corresponding measure in the United States, the predicted volatility of 
the annual rates of change of GDPP is 1.59 percentage point under quasi-pegging, but that figure 
more than doubles to 3.21 percentage points when there are three years in a row that have the 
nominal peso-dollar exchange rate move by 5 percent or more but by less than 40 percent from 
beginning to end of each year (so that the centered average dummy value is 1). The predicted 
increase is from 1.59 to 2.67 when the three-year rolling average exchange-rate regime index has 
just two such years in it and one that is quasi-pegged (so that the average dummy value is 2/3). 
The difference made by the exchange regime is smaller for GDPH than for GDPP. For instance, 
raising the value of the dummy variable from 0 to 1 produces a 76-percent, rather than 102-
percent, increase in the volatility of the respective measure, using the mean of U.S. volatility in 
solving the last two equations in Table III for Forex-Regime dummy value 1 versus 0.   
While acting non-pegged thus is associated with much greater remaining volatility for 
Mexico, Table III also shows that the size of exchange rate movements is unrelated to the stability 
that is left to be observed in Canada with these movements. Hence it appears that Canada (and 
international financial markets) handled matters well by keeping the exchange rate with USD 
quasi-pegged most of the time, but sometimes letting it move by 5 percent or more to maintain a 
given degree of economic stability. If the quality of exchange-rate management and functioning in 
Canada’s free capital market are uniformly high, but the stance that is optimal changes with 
shocks, one might expect the exchange-rate regime not to be a significant explanatory factor in 
the volatility of rates of growth of PPP-GDP per person or per hour that remains to be observed: 
The exchange regime has already done its best to reduce that volatility.  
Yet there is no support for the suggestion, sometimes entertained by staff of the Bank of 
Canada (see, for instance, Schembri, 2001), that what is appropriate for a financially highly 
developed and credible country like Canada is appropriate also for Brazil and Mexico which lack 
these attributes. “Small” countries like Canada that are net exporters of financial services and 
leaders in global financial management and innovation may very well keep their own money for 
the time being without incurring any net cost. Others would clearly be better off to adopt a money 
of international standing, which they themselves can not bring forth, to obtain access to high-
quality monetary and financial services. Hausmann et al. (2000, 135-138) carefully distinguish 
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the constructive exchange-rate experience of Canada, and of major European countries during the 
ERM crisis (1992-1993), from the experience of Latin American countries with their own 
currencies in this regard. 
 
3.5  Further Sensitivity and Validation Tests 
Having already relied on the combined evidence obtained from two welfare-relevant 
measures of PPP-GDP rather than just one, further sensitivity tests are in order. These relate to (a) 
possible breaks in the time-series relations, (b) the special role of commitment to the narrow 
“Bretton Woods” fluctuations of 1 percent on either side of the declared parity with USD inside 
the quasi-pegged category, and (c) the use of a continuous variable, instead of a discontinuous or 
dummy variable, to characterize regimes by the degree of exchange-rate fluctuations.  
(a) The FTA between Canada and the United States concluded in January 1989 and the 
financial liberalization in Mexico which Obstfeld and Taylor (2004, 252) date from the same 
month suggest checking whether the coefficients shown in Table III might be different for the 
sub-period starting in 1989 from those applying earlier. Volatility spillover from the United States 
to both Canada and Mexico could well have become more intense since 1989 and capital flows to 
Mexico much larger and less stable. However, adding the respective explanatory variables once 
more but now multiplied by a dummy that was set to 0 before 1989 and to 1 from 1989 on to 
allow for coefficient change for the latter period never yielded statistically significant results on 
the subdivision.13 Hence there is no statistical evidence of a break in the time-series relations for 
either Mexico or Canada around 1989. 
(b) It is reasonable to hypothesize that exchange-rate expectations and “anchoring” effects 
relevant for economic stability are different for countries committed to the Bretton Woods system 
and for countries whose exchange rate with USD just happened to change little over a period of 
time without the support of such a formal commitment. Canada was a reliable member of the 
Bretton Woods system for only 7 full calendar years, 1963-1969. Mexico kept its exchange rate 
fixed within the narrow Bretton-Woods margins (rather than the wider “Smithsonian” margins of 
+/- 2.25 percent of par authorized in 1971) from after a major devaluation in 1954 to 1976. Its 
period of firm commitment to the Bretton Woods system was dated 1956-1970, but choosing a 
terminal date as early as 1969 and as late as 1975 made little quantitative and no qualitative 
difference to the results reported below. Hence a Bretton-Woods dummy that was set to 1 for 
Canada for each year from 1963 through 1969, and for Mexico from 1956 through 1970, was 
added to the specifications shown in Table III. The result for the GDPH measure, that started in 
1962, was that the coefficient on the Bretton Woods dummy was negative insignificant (-0.52 
(with t-value of -0.72)) for Mexico and positive insignificant (0.45(1.94)) for Canada with little 
else changed. If one were to make anything of these statistically insignificant coefficients it would 
be that Mexico gained stability from the firmer commitment while Canada sacrificed stability for 
it, as if tying its hands needlessly. However, this interpretation does not fit the results obtained 
with the GDPP data starting in 1952 because the sign pattern is reversed for the two countries, 
though with absolute t-values much smaller still. Hence characterizing centered average exchange 
rates that change by less than 5 percent during a year as belonging to a single regime called 
“quasi-pegged” is not to be faulted for failing to allow separately for Bretton-Woods effects 
within this category. 
(c) There may be regime-specific stability effects that have to do with the perceived 
membership in a particular regime and not so much with the exact amount of exchange-rate 
change supporting that perception. Yet the breakpoints set between regimes, at 5 percent and 40 
percent exchange-rate change, are to some extent arbitrary. A way of proceeding with less prior 
imposition is to calculate the three-year centered moving average of the absolute values of 
                                                          
13
  This lack of significant or consistently growing volatility spillover from the United States to Mexico is 
somewhat surprising in view of Torres and Vela’s (2003) finding of recent increases in cyclical 
interdependence. 
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(logarithmic) exchange-rate changes between successive yearends so as to create a continuous 
variable characterizing the absolute size of exchange-rate change. This variable is called 
ForexContinuChange in Table IV. Except for the inevitable difference in the size of the regression 
coefficients due to the dimensional change,14 the results obtained with ForexContinuChange are 
very nearly the same as those reported with ForexRegimeDummy in Table III. In particular, the 
significance levels of all matching FOREX coefficients are similar and the standard errors of the 
final estimate, in the last row of regression results in Tables III and IV, are almost the same. 
Hence the results appear robust with regard to the construction of the critical variable 
characterizing exchange-rate behavior and regime in this paper.  
 
4. Interpretation of Results 
 There is now a considerable literature relating to the question of which exchange-rate 
regime, combined with a monetary-policy rule such as inflation-targeting when floating, is best 
for economic growth and stability.  Even when such literature rests on de facto, rather than de 
jure, classifications of exchange-rate regimes, as seems eminently desirable, it does not proceed 
from the assumption that exchange-rate behavior is completely endogenous or model-determined. 
Rather, exchange-rate behavior shares some of the unpredictability of asset prices in inexplicable, 
and at times disturbing or crisis-aggravating, ways. Thus nominal exchange-rate flexibility can be 
a major source of extraneous shocks (Buiter, 1999, 34).  
If, on the other hand, nominal exchange-rate movements were attributable largely to 
“fundamentals” that caused the equilibrium level of the real exchange rate to wander about, in 
theory, nominal exchange-rate flexibility could raise the speed and reduce the cost of adjusting 
the real exchange rate when nominal wage and price rigidity stand in the way.15 Then if there 
were fundamental reasons for nominal exchange rates to change appreciably (5 percent or more 
according to our classification) in only some of the years, sample-selection bias would still make 
periods with appreciable exchange-rate movement appear more volatile than those in which 
exchange rates held steady simply because “nothing happened.” Although such bias can not be 
ruled out entirely, pegged rates have been so common that it is difficult to dismiss them as a fair-
weather phenomenon that can persist only as long as it is not challenged by fundamentals.   
Part of the reason is that the implications of any shock for the equilibrium level of the real 
exchange rate are rarely clear, even directionally. For instance, it is not clear in general whether 
positive productivity shocks should lead to an appreciation or depreciation of the equilibrium real 
exchange rate. Melvin (2003, 187) casually assumes the latter while the empirical evidence for a 
number of countries including Canada (Gauthier and Tessier, 2002) and Chile (Navarro and Soto, 
2001; Soto 2003) points the other way. Positive productivity shocks affecting much of a country’s 
export sector may either depreciate or appreciate the real exchange rate depending on the extent to 
which the country is a major international supplier facing limited elasticity of demand for its chief 
exports. The higher that elasticity -- in the derivation of the Balassa-Samuelson theorem it is 
assumed to be infinite -- the more likely it is that a real appreciation is the equilibrium outcome. 
In that case the increase in the relative price of nontraded goods swamps any slight reduction in 
the terms of trade brought on by a positive supply shock in the traded-goods sector. It is also 
                                                          
14
  The mean of ForexRegimeDummy for Mexico is 0.490, SD: 0.583, for 1952-2002 (0.561, SD: 0.612, for 1962-
2002) and that of ForexContinuChange is 0.1420, SD: 0.210 (0.168, SD: 0.225). The same data for Canada in the 
same order are 0.242, SD: 0.276 (0.301, SD: 0.277) and 0.031, SD 0.019 (0.032, SD: 0.021). Hence, if the alternative 
explanatory variables convey essentially the same information, the regression coefficient on the latter would be 
expected to be about three times as large as on the former for Mexico and about 14 times as large for Canada if the 
distribution of both variables were normal. Although the distribution of the three-state dummy variable for the 
ForexRegime shown in Table 2 obviously is not normal, the coefficients on ForexContinuChange in Table 4 increase 
much more for Canada than for Mexico relative to those on their respective ForexRegimeDummy in Table 3. 
15
 Research published by the Bank of Canada regularly reports findings indicating that “most of the variation in the 
real exchange rate ... is explained by real demand shocks and supply shocks” while “monetary shocks are 
unimportant” (Schembri, 2001, 33). See also Laidler (1999).   
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possible that such a shock calls for no appreciable response of the nominal exchange rate at all. In 
fact, as reviewed and analyzed in Hausmann et al. (2000, 141-144), few countries have found it 
useful to have high volatility in their terms of trade spill over to their key exchange rate. The 
reason appears to be that such countries obtain what they most need from pegging: deeper 
financial markets on which they can depend to tide themselves over and to help adjust to high 
degrees of variability in their terms of trade. 
Edwards and Magendzo (2002) conclude that macroeconomic volatility is found not  to 
differ significantly across dollarized and non-dollarized economies if a matching-estimator 
technique is employed. This paper has not dealt with comparable economies that made different 
choices but with different economies that ultimately have made the same formal choice of 
exchange-rate regime. Yet judging by the volatility behavior of the rates of change in GDPP and 
GDPH, in Mexico, the macroeconomic volatility remaining turned out to be about twice as high 
in periods with significant exchange-rate changes as in periods in which the exchange rate 
remained quasi-pegged. Hence if the composition, size, and frequency of shocks to fundamentals 
did not differ systematically over time, the effects of shocks appeared easier to cushion during 
quasi-pegged periods in Mexico than during periods when there was much more net movement in 
the key exchange rate with USD. Edwards and Magendzo’s finding, using alternative control 
groups, was instead that the volatility of growth never differed significantly for dollarized and 
non-dollarized countries. Comparability is limited since time-series findings for countries that 
have experienced a number of de facto exchange-rate regime changes, and results for cross-
sections of countries differing by regime, are known frequently to be different for reasons given, 
for instance, in Rose (2004, 102). Indeed, far from finding fixed exchange rates to be a fair-
weather standard, Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2003) suggest that terms-of-trade shocks get 
amplified in countries that have more-rigid exchange-rate regimes. Hence it is all the more 
surprising in relation to their findings, but not those of Hausmann (2000, 134, 147), that I found a 
strong positive relationship between macroeconomic volatility and exchange-rate movements 
between yearends. 
For Mexico, in particular after its 1994 entry into NAFTA, it is also useful to recall 
McKinnon’s (1973, 85-86) long-standing judgment that “independent national policies are neither 
necessary nor desirable if exchange rate changes can upset carefully negotiated tariff, tax, and 
pricing policies.” Fernández-Arias, Panizza and Stein (2004) documented the disastrous effects of 
exchange-rate misalignments among countries that are parties to a regional economic-integration 
agreement. Whether such misalignments are precipitated by unilateral changes in the exchange-
rate regime of a country vis-à-vis its partners (Brazil vs. Mercosur partners, 1999) or by capital 
shocks and socioeconomic pathologies or political traumata affecting just one country, exchange-
rate responses that are driven by bad policies and politics spread the costs of a country’s 
governance failures to its closest partners in trade and finance. Susceptibility to large and sudden 
exchange-rate-induced changes in competitiveness among the parties to regional trade agreements 
is not conducive to deep and low-risk economic and financial integration among them.    
The question whether quasi-pegging is a standard that has delivered economic results 
under all kinds of weather, on a par with the other standards of exchange-rate behavior, relates 
also to the factors causing exchange-rate regimes to change. There are a few countries, such as 
Chile, that made a smooth and unforced transition from crawling pegs in a widening band to 
genuine floating, a transition completed in September 1999. Mexico repegged soon after every 
major postwar currency crisis except the crisis of 1994/95. The Mexican Central Bank’s 
conviction, echoed by the IMF (2004b, 73) that “Mexico’s flexible exchange rate regime has been 
effective in cushioning the economy from external shocks” since that time begs the question of 
how much more stable and prosperous that economy might have been without its own money.16 
                                                          
16
  IMF (2004a, 82) shows that Mexico’s real effective exchange rate (REER) has been highly variable from 1995 to 
2004 compared with that of China which had maintained a tight dollar peg over this period. The latter publication 
also contains statements inconsistent with the staff’s conclusion about the “effective economic cushioning” of 
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Berg et al. (2002, 232), for instance, have previously concluded on trade grounds that Mexico’s 
would enhance its stability by giving up its own currency. 
There is other evidence that letting the exchange rate go, forced or freely, is not 
confidence-inspiring in Mexico. A recent paper (von Furstenberg and Tabora, 2004) found that, 
while depreciations normally are expected to raise total local (currency) returns in countries 
whose major listings are highly export-oriented, but not by enough to keep international 
(currency) holding-period returns from falling, in Mexico, a depreciation of the peso strongly and 
significantly depresses local returns and hence international returns twice as strongly. This finding 
was based on data for 1996-2002 not containing any currency crisis.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 Canada and Mexico now use inflation targeting to achieve low rates of inflation with 
similar instruments. Both allow their currency to float independently against each of their 
NAFTA partners but both tend to resist large movements in their exchange rate with the United 
States. In addition, NAFTA partners Canada and Mexico are equally dependent on trade with the 
United States. In spite of these similarities, the effects of non-pegged exchange rates on the 
stability of their living standards appear to be quite different. This paper has demonstrated that 
macroeconomic instability is more likely to have been abetted than allayed by exchange-rate 
changes in Mexico. For instance, a period in which exchange rates change by at least 5 percent 
but less than 40 percent in each of three consecutive years is associated with macroeconomic 
volatility that is higher than in a period of steadier exchange rates by between 76 and 102 percent 
depending on whether the measure of PPP-GDP per hour or per person is chosen. Stability 
benefits from moving from non-pegged not just to a quasi-fixed exchange rate, but to a full-
fledged monetary union likely would be even greater. 
By contrast, the exchange-rate variations that have occurred in Canada do not appear to 
have been volatility-increasing or systematically disturbing to real economic activity. Canada 
does not suffer from “original sin,” an inability to borrow long-term in its own currency in 
international financial markets. The partial US-dollarization of business and financing that exists 
in export-oriented Canadian corporations does not pose a major risk of currency mismatches. For 
the economy as a whole, exchange-rate pass-through to domestic wages and prices is slow and 
fractional. Hence, as Dean (2001) has emphasized, “fear of floating” would be unfounded. 
Country and currency risk premiums against the United States and the USD have become 
insubstantial for CAD compared with MXP. Canada’s fiscal stance is very sound, its governance 
is rated clean and efficient, its federal and provincial institutions are credible, and its currency and 
financial expertise are world-class. Since none of these quality attributes applies to countries 
south of the US border, the Canadian experience does not apply to them. Indeed differences 
between Canada and Mexico were shown to be stark, with Canada not troubled by a destabilizing 
relation between the size of exchange rate movements and the macroeconomic volatility captured 
in the PPP-GDP data.  
There is one other interesting difference between Canada and Mexico that relates to their 
monetary independence from the United States in view of the volatility spillovers received from 
that country. For Mexico, these spillovers are small and statistically insignificant as Mexico 
appears quite capable of making much of its own “noise.” But instead of this lack of appreciable 
symmetry in the cross-country pattern of observed PPP-GDP volatilities leading to a high degree 
of monetary independence from the United States, Mexico’s average monthly interbank rate 
predictably moved by an amount 1.9 times of and with any change in the average monthly U.S. 
federal funds rate. This result was obtained with monthly data from January 2000 through 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Mexico’s flexible exchange rate that was endorsed October 18, 2004 by the IMF Executive Board. Among these 
statements by IMF staff and authorities, respectively, are that Mexico still needs to look to “provide room for policy 
actions to buffer shocks” (p. 30), hinting at fear of floating, and that “the peso depreciation since February [2004] was 
not based on fundamentals” (p. 25).  
 29
October 2004. Although the volatility spillover from the United States to Canada was much larger 
and statistically significant, the overnight borrowing rate in Canada responded with a coefficient 
significantly below 1 to any change in the U.S. federal funds rate. Because of greater symmetry of 
the observed PPP-GDP volatilities, Canada had more reason to shadow U.S. interest rates than 
Mexico. However, it did so only one-third as much, with a coefficient of 0.6 rather than 1.9, 
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 Table I  
Correlation Matrix of Rates of Change in GDPH and GDPP for the 
United States, Canada, and Mexico, 1961-2003 
 
        
 
        
 
  GDPH GDPH GDPH GDPP GDPP GDPP 
 
  US CA MX US CA MX 
 
        
 
 US-GDPH 1      
 
 CA-GDPH 0.590 1      
 MX-GDPH 0.222 0.283 1    
 
 US-GDPP 0.601 0.338 0.163 1    
 CA-GDPP 0.456 0.449 0.309 0.778 1   
 MX-GDPP 0.180 0.141 0.900 0.165 0.273 1  
        
 
         
         
     Notes: Bold type indicates coefficients that are statistically significant at  
                the 5 percent level. Italicized values are mentioned in the text.   
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 Table II  
De Facto Classification of Exchange-Rate Regimes in  
Canada and Mexico, 1950-2003 
 
      
 
Canada Canada   Mexico Mexico Mexico 
 
      
 













      
 
1950 - 1969 1970  1950 - 1953 1977 1954 
 
1971 - 1976 1977 - 1978  1955 - 1975 1981 1976 
 
1979 - 1983 1984 - 1985  1978 - 1980 1984 1982 - 1983 
 
1986 1987 - 1988  1988 1989 - 1990 1985 - 1987 
 
1989 - 1991 1992  1991 - 1993 1998 1994 - 1995 
 
1993 1994  1996 - 1997 2002 - 2003  
 
1995 - 1997 1998 - 1999  1999 - 2001   
 
2000 2001     
 
2002 2003     
 
 
Notes: Exchange rates are classified as quasi-pegged in any year if they changed by less 
than 5 percent during that year from the preceding to the current yearend. They are 
classified as non-pegged (N-P) otherwise. In Mexico, two types of N-P regimes are 
encountered. One, simply described as N-P, applies to exchange rate changes of 5 percent 
or more but less than 40 percent in any year. The second, non-pegged freely-falling, 
applies to nominal exchange-rate changes (all depreciations) of 40 percent or more. That 






Regression Results for Volatility Measures of GDPH and GDPP 







































 Canada Canada  Mexico Mexico 
Volatility Measure for: GDPP GDPH  GDPP GDPH 
      
Intercept 0.958 0.848  1.533 2.239 
[t-value] [2.42] [3.22]  [2.70] [3.00] 
      
Correspond. Volatility 0.484 0.173  0.028 -0.408 
Measure for the US [3.82] [0.89]  [0.13] [-0.82] 
      
ForexRegimeDummy -0.234 0.081  1.619 1.418 
[t-value] [-0.39] [0.22]  [3.41] [2.50] 
      
RHO [on e(t-1)] 0.545 0.403  0.398 0.582 
[t-value] [4.59] [2.79]  [3.07] [4.53] 
      
Durbin-Watson -- e(t) 0.911 1.193  1.204 0.836 
Durbin-Watson -- u(t) 1.811 1.668  1.962 1.988 
      
Standard Error -- e(t) 0.948 0.546  1.502 1.638 
Standard Error -- u(t) 0.795 0.499  1.378 1.332 
      
      
Note: Bold type indicates coefficients that are statistically significant. 
      
Memo: 
     
Mean of Volatility 1.86 1.01  2.38 2.67 
SD of Volatility 1.13 0.53  1.76 1.86 
      
Corresponding  US Volatility Measure used as Explanatory Variable: 
US-Mean: 1.90 0.92 US-SD: 1.13 0.47 
 (GDPP) (GDPH)  (GDPP) (GDPH) 
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Table IV 
Regression Results for Volatility Measures of GDPH and GDPP 
































 Canada Canada  Mexico Mexico 
Volatility Measure for: GDPP GDPH  GDPP GDPH 
      
Intercept 0.872 0.761  1.797 3.049 
[t-value] [1.91] [2.68]  [3.23] [4.66] 
      
Correspond. Volatility 0.498 0.184  -0.021 -0.753 
Measure for the US [4.00] [0.96]  [-0.10] [-1.51] 
      
ForexContinuChange 0.773 3.131  4.414 1.756 
[t-value] [0.01] [0.65]  [3.19] [3.53] 
      
RHO [on e(t-1)] 0.544 0.403  0.426 0.619 
[t-value] [4.58] [2.79]  [3.33] [5.05] 
      
Durbin-Watson -- e(t) 0.912 1.157  1.148 0.762 
Durbin-Watson -- u(t) 1.803 1.683  1.938 1.879 
      
Standard Error -- e(t) 0.949 0.543  1.534 1.718 
Standard Error -- u(t) 0.797 0.497  1.388 1.350 
      
      
Note: Bold type indicates coefficients that are statistically significant. 
 
     
